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Only days after his inauguration as U.S. President, Donald J. Trump 
withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 
“mega” regional free trade agreement that would have established the 
world’s largest free trade zone. Although President Trump announced that 
the withdrawal was justified because the TPP was an unfair agreement, the 
Trump Administration seems to have ignored or been unaware of the negative 
consequences of the decision: (1) as a consequence of the U.S. withdrawal, 
China has achieved a major strategic advantage in Asia through its own rival 
free trade agreement and now will be able to write the rules for trade in Asia 
and possibly beyond; and (2) the TPP would have resulted in significant 
economic gains to the United States as supported by a large body of economic 
studies analyzed in this article. Although the U.S. withdrawal has harmed its 
own interests, the decision is reversible because the United States can rejoin 
the TPP. While the path to reentry seems smooth at the moment, there is 
urgency for U.S. action. Reentering the TPP could become much more 
difficult if China first joins as the United States will need the approval of all 
TPP members, including China, to rejoin. 
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INTRODUCTION	
 
On January 30, 2017, only ten days after his inauguration as U.S. 
President, Donald J. Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), a “mega” regional trade agreement (RTA) consisting of 
twelve nations encompassing most of Asia and approximately 40% of world 
trade.1 The U.S. withdrawal terminated an arduous nearly eight year effort by 
the Obama Administration to create the world’s largest free trade zone.2 The 
																																								 																				
1 Dave Sherwood, Eleven Nations – But Not U.S. – to Sign Trans-Pacific Trade Deal¸ REUTERS 
(Mar. 8, 2018, 1:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/trade-tpp/eleven-nations-but-not-u-
s-to-sign-trans-pacific-trade-deal-idUSL2N1QN0S7. For the full text of the TPP, see TPP Full 
Text, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements 
/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) [hereinafter TPP]. 
2 Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Trade Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-
trade-nafta.html. 
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reason given by the Trump Administration for withdrawal is that TPP is an 
unfair agreement that harms U.S. interests.3 This reason is linked to President 
Trump’s “America First” trade policies that are based on a theory of 
economic nationalism and protectionism.4 These policies reflect the belief 
that international trade is a zero-sum game, and that the United States has 
long been the victim of “unfair” trade agreements that benefit trade partners 
at the expense of the U.S.5 In his inaugural address, President Trump 
indicated that U.S. policy would take a different direction under his 
administration: “We must protect our borders from the ravages of other 
countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our 
jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.”6 
The President’s trade policies are elaborated in the President’s 2017 
National Trade Policy Agenda7 submitted by the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) and the chief U.S. official on trade policy. The USTR 
declared: 
 
The overarching purpose of our trade policy – the guiding 
principle behind all of our actions in this key area – will be to 
expand trade in a way that is freer and fairer for all Americans. 
Every action we take with respect to trade will be designed to 
increase our economic growth, promote job creation in the United 
States, promote reciprocity with our trading partners, strengthen 
our manufacturing base and our ability to defend ourselves, and 
expand our agricultural and services industry exports.8 
																																								 																				
3 See Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017) 
(withdrawing from the TPP because of the need for “fair and economically beneficial trade 
deals” that serve the interests of the American people). 
4 See Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World Trade Organization, 
B.U. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1–2) (on file with the Boston University 
International Law Journal) [hereinafter Chow, Unilateralism] (analyzing the Trump admin-
istration’s international trade policies). 
5 See id. (characterizing the Trump administration’s trade policies as economic nationalism 
wherein the U.S. defends against unfavorable trade deals by seeking new agreements 
intended to promote U.S. interests). 
6 Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/ [https://perma.cc/LEQ9-5VL7]. 
7 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., THE PRESIDENT’S 2017 TRADE POLICY AGENDA 1 (2017), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2017/2017-trade-
policy-agenda-and-2016 [https://perma.cc/6GD7-PURP] [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REP., 2017 TRADE POLICY]. 
8 Id.  
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In order to achieve what is termed “fair” trade,9 the USTR identified 
four priorities:  
 
(1) defend U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy; (2) 
strictly enforce U.S. trade laws; (3) use all possible sources 
of leverage to encourage other countries to open their 
markets to U.S. exports of goods and services, and provide 
adequate and effective protection and enforcement of U.S. 
intellectual property rights; and (4) negotiate new and better 
trade deals with countries in key markets around the world.10  
 
Under the first priority, the United States has indicated that it will 
ignore international law, including the rules and decisions of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), when it harms U.S. interests.11 Under the second 
priority the United States has asserted the right to impose unilateral trade 
sanctions in the form of increased tariffs against many of its trading 
partners.12 These sanctions apply not only to trade with China, but also to 
nations such as Canada, Mexico, Germany, and Japan with which the United 
States has friendly relations.13 Under the third, and fourth priorities, the 
																																								 																				
9 The concept of “fair” trade has its roots in political discourse in 19th century Britain, but it also 
characterized U.S. criticism of trading relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the 
1980’s: “Congressman, businessmen, editorialists and the media have repeatedly emphasized 
fairness in trade, ‘level playing fields’ and reciprocity of access as a pre-condition for a trade 
regime to be acceptable to the United States.” See Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Douglas A. Irwin, The 
Return of the Reciprocitarians – US Trade Policy Today, 10 WORLD ECON. 109, 117–18 (1987). 
See also Patrick K. O’Brien & Geoffrey Allen Pigman, Free Trade, British Hegemony and the 
International Economic Order in the Nineteenth Century, 18 REV. INT’L STUD. 89, 105–107 
(1992) (discussing the 19th century origins of Britain’s fair trade movement).    
10  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 TRADE POLICY, supra note 7, at 2.  
11 See Chow, Unilateralism, supra note 4, at 6–7 (arguing that the Trump administration has 
interpreted WTO rules as allowing the U.S. to unilaterally void WTO decisions that add or 
diminish rights set forth in WTO agreements). 
12 See id. at 14 (pointing to the U.S. issuance of unilateral trade sanctions against China 
despite WTO prohibitions). 
13 When the Trump Administration announced its tariffs, they were generally applicable. See, 
e.g., Press Release, President Trump Approves Relief for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar Cell 
Manufacturers, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/january/president-trump-approves-relief-us [https://perma. 
cc/X9DL-NB5A] (announcing new tariffs on all imported washing machines and solar cells). C.f. 
Proclamation No. 9704, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 
11,619, 11,619–20 (Mar. 8, 2018) (announcing generally applicable tariffs on aluminum imports, 
except those from Canada and Mexico); Proclamation No. 9705, Adjusting Imports of Steel into 
the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625, 11,625–26 (Mar. 8, 2018) (announcing generally 
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United States is using the threat of economic sanctions to induce its trading 
partners to make trade concessions and revise existing trade agreements that 
are supposedly “unfavorable” to the United States.14 For example, after the 
United States announced across-the-board additional tariffs on steel and 
aluminum on March 1, 2018, South Korea immediately agreed to revise the 
U.S.-Korea (KORUS) free trade agreement by agreeing to export less steel 
and aluminum to the United States in order to avoid the tariffs.15 Treasury 
Secretary Steven Mnuchin declared, “I think the strategy has worked, quite 
frankly. We announced the tariff. We said we were going to proceed. But, 
again, we said we’d simultaneously negotiate.” Secretary Mnuchin boasted 
that this was a “win-win” situation for both countries,16 suggesting that the 
United States is hoping to duplicate this approach to induce other countries 
to revise their trade agreements. Some countries claim that the United States 
is not negotiating but is using the threat of trade sanctions to intimidate its 
trading partners to capitulate to new trade concessions.17 
																																								 																				
applicable tariffs on steel imports, except those from Canada and Mexico). But see Everett 
Rosenfeld, US Extends Tariff Exemptions for European Union and Other Allies, CNBC (Apr. 30, 
2018, 8:14 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/30/us-extends-tariff-exemptions-for-eu-and-
other-allies.html (while the tariffs were applicable to all counties, multiple exemptions were made 
for allies) [https://perma.cc/9AVZ-LWFC] (reporting that the U.S. has extended deadlines for 
negotiations on foreign exemptions for steel and aluminum tariffs). 
14 See Chow, Unilateralism, supra note 4, at 20–22 (reviewing the legality of the Trump 
administration’s threat of trade sanctions to induce revision of trade agreements and the use 
of this practice against South Korea). 
15 On March 28, 2018, South Korea agreed to limit its exports of steel and aluminum to the U.S. 
to 2.68 tons of steel exports to the U.S. per year roughly 70% of the annual average import volume 
of steel exports from Korea to the U.S. for the years 2015–17.  See Alan Rappeport & Jim 
Tankersley, Trump Gets First Major Trade Deal as South Korea Looks to Avoid Tariffs, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/business/south-korea-us-tariffs.html 
[https://perma.cc/9Z5B-6YR8]; also Press Release, Joint Statement by the United States Trade 
Representative Robert E. Lighthizer and Republic of Korea Minister for Trade Hyun Chong Kim, 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2018/march/joint-statement-united-states-trade [https://perma.cc/HHP8-DV 
ZF] (announcing agreement revising the terms of the KORUS agreement and exempting South 
Korea from steel tariffs); see also Fact Sheet, New U.S. Trade Policy and National Security 
Outcomes with the Republic of Korea, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Mar. 28, 2018), https:// 
ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018/march/new-us-trade-policy-and-nat 
ional [https://perma.cc/4NXT-6R6Z] (summarizing the outcome of the trade agreement revision). 
16 Id. 
17 See Hans von der Burchard & Jakob Hanke, Trump is Winning Trade War — for Now, 
POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2018, 5:07 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/president-donald-trump-win 
ning-the-trade-war-for-now-steel-aluminum-tariffs/ [https://perma.cc/PY9B-J6N6] (reporting EU 
objections to the Trump administration’s threats to impose tariff sanctions in exchange for more 
favorable trade agreement terms). 
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The revision of KORUS proceeded at a breakneck pace lasting only 
a few weeks,18 but revising a multilateral agreement such as TPP with twelve 
members could prove complex and time consuming.19 In the case of TPP, the 
U.S. strategy is to first withdraw from the agreement and then to negotiate 
bilateral agreements with each of the other eleven nations.20 Once limited to 
a bilateral negotiation with a single trading partner, the United States will be 
able to use its economic clout in a one-on-one negotiation to obtain a new 
bilateral agreement that will contain terms favorable to the United States.21    
Although the U.S. withdrawal was originally thought to signal the 
demise of TPP, the remaining 11 nations completed new negotiations and, on 
March 8, 2018, the revised agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also known as TPP11, was signed by 
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.22 CPTPP is scheduled to come into effect 
within two years if all requirements are met.23 
																																								 																				
18 The trade sanctions were announced on March 1, 2018 and South Korea agreed to trade 
concessions and revisions of KORUS on March 27, 2018. See Press Release, U.S. Trade 
Representative, supra note 15 (announcing conclusion of trade sanctions); Ana Seanson, 
Trump to Impose Sweeping Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018), www. 
nytimes.com/2018/03/01/business/trump-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/JH4F-J7RR] (report-
ing on President Trump’s announced intent to impose steel and aluminum tariffs). 
19 See Christopher Moser & Andrew Rose, Why Do Trade Negotiations Take So Long?, VOX: 
CEPR POLICY PORTAL (June 8, 2012), https://voxeu.org/article/why-do-trade-negotiations-take-
so-long [https://perma.cc/4GFA-MQCS] (finding that trade “negotiations take significantly longer 
when they involve more countries, especially if the countries are spread across different regions”). 
20 The USTR has stated that “[a]s a general matter, we believe that [U.S.] goals can be best 
accomplished by focusing on bilateral negotiations rather than multilateral negotiations – 
and by renegotiating and revising trade agreements when our goals are not being met.” 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 TRADE POLICY, supra note 7, at 1. 
21 While the United States has negotiating leverage in bilateral negotiations, extracting a favorable 
deal under a bilateral negotiation could bring negotiating states in violation of the WTO. See 
Harry G. Broadman, Trump’s Misplaced Penchant for Bilateral Trade Deals, FORBES (Jan. 31, 
2018 10:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/harrybroadman/2018/01/31/trumps-misplaced-
penchant-for-bilateral-trade-deals/#774ca5de57b9 [https://perma.cc/L83U-437V] (noting that 
the WTO requires members negotiating PTAs to comply with WTO rules, and that WTO 
members that create WTO-inconsistent agreements may face sanctions from members at large). 
Bilateral negotiations can also harm the United States, as a collection of them prevents 
harmonization of international trade rules that promote growth. See id. (pointing to the difficulties 
in aligning bilateral and multi-lateral agreements in a globalized market that hinders compliance). 
22 Tim McDonald, Asia-Pacific Trade Deal Signed by 11 Nations, BBC (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43326314 [https://perma.cc/C4DA-XY58].  
23 The CPTPP will enter into force sixty days after the signatories have ratified it or, if this does 
not occur not within two years of its initial signing, when at least half of the signatories accounting 
for 85% of the combined GDP of the original signatories in 2013 have signed it. Comprehensive 
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While the United States’ decision to withdraw from TPP is consistent 
with its announced trade policies, the United States seems to have overlooked 
the potential harms to its immediate and long term economic and strategic 
interests. First, the Trump Administration seems to have ignored a large body 
of economic research indicating that TPP would have resulted in significantly 
increased trade and economic development opportunities for the United 
States and other TPP countries.24 These are opportunities that may now 
redound in some form to the benefit of the remaining eleven members, but in 
which the United States will not share. In addition, it is unclear whether and 
how long it will take for the United States to negotiate bilateral trade 
agreements with the remaining eleven nations. Even if this were to occur, it 
is unclear whether these agreements will result in equivalent trade benefits. 
Second, in addition to economic benefits from TPP, there are also significant 
strategic U.S. interests that may be compromised by a withdrawal.25 TPP was 
designed to allow the United States to create new legal standards for trade in 
Asia, China’s own backyard, which would far exceed those set forth by the 
WTO.26 Not only would TPP have established higher standards for Asia as a 
whole but TPP was created with the specific goal of containing China, the 
United States’ chief rival in trade.27 It is no exaggeration to say that China 
was the target of every major provision in TPP.28 Moreover, the United States 
deliberately excluded China from the TPP negotiations so that China could 
not challenge or dilute the new standards in TPP.29 The United States’ plan 
was to complete TPP without China and then confront China with a difficult 
																																								 																				
and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 30.5, opened for signature Mar. 8, 2018 [herein-
after CPTPP], https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-
concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-
partnership-text/.  
24 See infra Part III. 
25 See infra Part II. 
26 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: DETAILED 
SUMMARY OF U.S. OBJECTIVES 5, 7–9 (Sept. 2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-
Detailed-Summary-of-US-Objectives.pdf (rejecting trade rules and practices dictated by 
China and listing objectives that address tariffs, reciprocal access, and state-owned 
enterprises in addition to changes that “build on WTO commitments” in several areas). 
27 See Daniel C.K. Chow, How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to 
Contain China in International Trade, 17 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 372, 372–74 (2017) 
[hereinafter Chow, Trans-Pacific Partnership] (explaining how the provisions in the TPP 
and China’s exclusion from the negotiations “w[ere] no accident, but instead w[ere] a 
deliberate ploy by the U.S. to limit China’s growing global trade influence”). 
28 See id. at 374 (arguing that containing China was the U.S.’s central focus for trade 
negotiations). 
29 See id. at 372–73 (positing that the U.S. wanted to dictate the terms of the TPP to limit 
China’s trade influence). 
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choice: reject TPP and lose the trade benefits that would come with 
membership or join TPP and be subject to tough new standards that were 
specifically designed to address U.S. concerns about some of China’s most 
controversial trade practices.30 Of course, China did not stand by idly while 
the United States embarked on this plan; China was creating a competing 
RTA of its own for Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), which by some measures would be even larger than TPP.31 
Returning the favor, China excluded the United States from the negotiations 
for RCEP.32 By rejecting TPP, the United States may now have relinquished 
this strategic goal of containing China, giving China, armed with its own 
RTA designed to offset TPP, the clear upper hand in Asia.33 
This article will develop these themes as follows. Part II will discuss 
the background to TPP and how it includes standards exceeding those of the 
WTO that were designed in significant part to limit China. Part III will 
examine the large body of economic research that shows the expected 
economic benefits of TPP for the United States and its other members. Part 
IV will discuss China’s competing RTA for Asia and how China may have 
gained the advantage with the U.S. rejection of TPP. The article concludes 
by examining future courses of action for the United States. 
 
I. GOALS OF TPP 
	
A. History of TPP 
 
TPP, signed in early-October 2015, would have been the largest RTA 
struck in the past two decades, and along with the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) that was under negotiation between the United 
																																								 																				
30 See id. at 375 (stating that the TPP placed China in the difficult position of either choosing 
to “suffer losses in international trade by refusing to join the TPP, or it can join the TPP and 
be subject to the humiliation of having to abide by rules written by the U.S. with the express 
intent of containing China”). 
31 See Rosalind Mathieson, Agreeing on RCEP — China’s Favorite Trade Deal — Set to 
Drag into 2018, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/14/ 
business/agreeing-rcep-chinas-favorite-trade-deal-set-drag-2018/#.W1oOT9JJGUk [https://per 
ma.cc/MQM5-2ZTW] (reporting on the renewed focus on the RCEP following the United 
States’s withdrawal from the TPP). 
32 See id. (stating the United Statates was not included in the negotiations).  
33 See Freddie Kleiner, Trump Leaves Asia Door Open for China to Dominate Trade, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2fe572fc-ff39-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30 (discussing 
how the Trump Administration’s withdrawal puts the United States’ influence at risk). 
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States and European Union (EU),34 it represented an important new direction 
in trade liberalization. 
In 2014, TPP countries accounted for approximately 36% of the world’s 
economy, and 23% of world trade.35 If ratified, TPP was anticipated to reduce 
more than 18,000 tariffs, including many agricultural trade barriers.36 In 2014, 
the eleven other members of TPP, accounted for $680 billion worth of U.S. 
exports, with Canada, Japan and Mexico accounting for 85% of the total.37 
TPP, and other “mega”-trade deals such as TTIP, have emerged 
amidst uncertainty about the global trading system and the future of the 
WTO. “Starting in the early 2000s, the rate of growth of global trade slowed 
relative to” GDP growth, and following the “great recession” trade was not 
driving growth of either industrialized or emerging economies.38 In the period 
2012 to 2016, the volume of world trade grew by only 3% a year, less than 
half the average rate of expansion of 7.6% in the pre-financial crisis period, 
reaching a low of 2.4% in 2016.39 Also, despite limited progress in the WTO 
with agreements to simplify customs rules and eliminate agricultural export 
subsidies being signed in December of 2013 (Bali Ministerial Conference) and 
																																								 																				
34 See Gabriel Felbermayr et al., Macroeconomic Potentials of Transatlantic Free Trade: A 
High Resolution Perspective for Europe and the World, 30 ECON. POL’Y 491, 493–494 
(2015) (stating that the proposed TPP plan would result in the “largest free trade area in the 
world” with significant worldwide impact). 
35 Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the TPP: New Estimates, 
in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 
6, 6 (2016), https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/assessing-trans-pacific-partnership-
volume-1-market-access-and-sectoral [hereinafter Petri & Plummer, Economic Effects]. 
36 OFFICE OF THE U. S. TRADE REP., 18,000 TAX CUTS ON MADE-IN-AMERICA EXPORTS: A 
GUIDE TO HOW TAX CUTS WILL BENEFIT EXPORTING IN YOUR STATES (2015),  https://ustr.gov/ 
sites/default/files/TPP-Guide-to-18000-Tax-Cuts.pdf; see also Caroline Freund et al., Tariff 
Liberalization, in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND 
SECTORAL ISSUES 31, 31 (2016), https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/assessing-trans-
pacific-partnership-volume-1-market-access-and-sectoral (finding that implementation of the 
TPP would result in the immediate elimination of nearly 75% of non-zero tariffs, and the 
elimination of 99% of non-zero tariffs following full implementation). 
37 See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44489, THE 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP): KEY PROVISIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2015) 
(summarizing the export and import stastistics among the 11 prospective TPP members 
compared to the U.S.). 
38 Bernard Hoekman, Trade and Growth – End of an Era?, in THE GLOBAL TRADE SLOW-
DOWN: A NEW NORMAL? 3, 4–5 (Bernard Hoekman ed., 2015) (ebook). 
39 INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 63 (2016), https://www.imf.org/en/ 
Publications/WEO/Issues/2016/12/31/Subdued-Demand-Symptoms-and-Remedies. Csilla 
Lakatos & Franziska Ohnsorge, Arm’s-Length Trade: A Source of Post-Crisis Trade Weakness 
1 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 8144, 2017), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ 
bitstream/handle/10986/27647/WPS8144.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
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2015 (Nairobi Ministerial Conference) respectively, the Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, initiated in 2001 and stalled for years, has been 
officially declared dead by the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration issued on 
December 19, 2015.40 At the same time, there has been a significant increase 
since 1992 in the number of RTAs globally, with over 455 currently in force and 
notified to the WTO.41 The United States itself already has fourteen RTAs in 
force with a total of twenty countries 42, and there are already eighty-five RTAs 
in existence affecting the East Asian region43, with others being negotiated. 
The negotiation of the TPP can be seen as the development of a 
framework for guiding further economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region, 
given the rapid growth of bilateral and regional RTAs that have affected 
countries in the region since 2000. From the standpoint of the United States, 
TPP was supposed to serve five important goals: first, it represented a “gold 
standard” for future trade agreements involving the United States, i.e., it was 
designed to cover dimensions such as trade in services and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) that are not part of the Doha Round;44 second, TPP has been 
seen as paving the way for broader economic integration in the Asia-Pacific 
region with the potential of generating much greater economic benefits than a 
typical, narrowly-defined RTA;45 third, TPP could have provided a model for 
taming the Asia-Pacific “noodle bowl” of overlapping RTAs in the region, 
where complex rules of origin (ROOs) can result in economic inefficiency;46 
																																								 																				
40 See World Trade Organization, Nairobi Ministerial Declaration of 19 December 2015, WTO 
Doc. WT/MIN(15)/DEC (noting that while some members wished to pursue the Doha 
Development Agenda, other members disagreed and sought “new approaches” for negotiations). 
41 Facts and Figures, Subsection to Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., https:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm#facts [https://perma.cc/X62A-CW39]. 
42 See Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (listing the countries with which the U.S. has free trade 
agreements, which includes 12 bilateral treaties and 2 multilateral agreements) (last visited 
October 1, 2018). See also Facts and Figures, supra note 41. 
43 Physical RTAs in Force, Participation by Region, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://rtais.wto. 
org/UI/Charts.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).  
44 Peter A. Petri et al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A 
Quantitative Assessment 6 (East-West Ctr. Working Papers, Econ. Series, Working Paper 
No. 119, 2011), https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/trans-pacific-partnership-and-
asia-pacific-integration-quantitative-assessment [https://perma.cc/754B-QULY] (summar-
izing the distinguishing features of the TPP). 
45Id. 
46 See id. at 6; see also Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 8 (discussing the benefits of the 
TPP to the United States, which includes increased efficiency in labor and capital markets). 
ROOs are designed to ensure that only goods primarily produced within an RTA are eligible 
for tariff preferences, therefore, a single set of ROOs would allow intermediate inputs 
produced in any TPP country to count towards meeting ROO standards. Id. at 8 n.10. 
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fourth, the United States would have got preferential access to some Asian 
markets covered by existing RTAs such as the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), which it is currently not a member;47 and fifth, TPP would 
have created important new constraints on China in international trade well 
beyond what currently exists under the WTO.48 
 
B.  Regionalism and the Rise of “Deep Integration” 
 
The pace of multilateral trade negotiations has slowed significantly 
since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, and the subsequent 
formation of the WTO. The latest round of WTO negotiations, known as the 
Doha Development Round, begun in 2001, were in deadlock for years before 
their official termination in 2015.49 Parallel to these negotiations, many WTO 
members and non-members have either negotiated or are in the process of 
negotiating RTAs.50 This shift in focus to regional trade liberalization has been 
driven by several factors. First, the world economy has become multi-polar, 
moving from one dominated by a “membership restricted to the willing” (the 
United States, EU, Japan, and Canada — collectively known as “the Quad”) 
able to promote multilateralism within the GATT/WTO,51 to one where 
emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
(BRICS) are now more able to influence and re-arrange the global trading 
																																								 																				
47 See Petri et al, supra note 44, at 6 (explaining that the TPP would help “level the playing 
field for U.S. exports to Asian markets” due to the exclusion of the U.S. from ASEAN). 
48 See id. at 7 (noting the analyses of the intent behind the TPP, with some considering the 
agreement an attempt to isolate or control China within the Asia Pacific region). 
49 See Shawn Donnan, World Trade Organisation Moves On from Stalled Doha Round, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/08968f4e-a682-11e5-9700-2b669a5aeb83 
(describing the “deep-seated differences” leading to the end of the Doha Round of negotiations 
initiated in 2001); Editorial, Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/global-trade-after-the-failure-of-
the-doha-round.html [https://perma.cc/RLJ3-6SDP] (opining on the termination of the Doha 
talks after 14 years of “fruitless” negotiations). 
50 See Facts and Figures, supra note 41 (noting the rise in RTAs which includes a “notable 
increase in large plurilateral agreements under negotiation”). 
51 See Paul Collier, Why the WTO is Dead-locked: And What Can Be Done About It?,  29 
WORLD ECON. 1423, 1425 (2006) (describing how the GATT was a means for “OECD 
countries to strike deals for reciprocal trade liberalisation,” but with the few participating 
developing countries marginalized in such agreements); see also Richard Baldwin, The World 
Trade Organization and the Future of Multilateralism, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 106 (2016) 
(describing how the GATT period was dominated by “the Quad” who held two-third of world 
imports and directed negotiations for trade agreements). 
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system.52 Second, trade linkages have become much more complex with 
disintegration of the vertical production chain and the associated increase in 
offshoring of production of intermediates by developed to developing 
countries.53 Third, most orthodox trade barriers have already been eliminated 
through eight successive rounds of the GATT, such that average ad valorem 
manufacturing tariffs have reached historic lows, at less than 4%.54 
In this context, there are  a number of reasons for why the WTO has 
made little progress towards further multilateral trade liberalization since the 
Doha Round began in 2001.55 First, during the lifetime of GATT, the Quad 
dominated global trade, accounting for two-thirds of imports, whereas now they 
account for half of world imports.56 The rapid growth of emerging economies 
and their accession to the WTO have probably reduced the Quad’s ability to push 
for increased market access. Second, the rapid growth of RTAs and associated 
tariff-cutting that might otherwise have been completed under the WTO has 
resulted in member countries using up domestic political capital, thereby making 
completion of the Doha Round more difficult.57 Third, many of the more recent 
RTAs have incorporated what are termed “deep” provisions that go well beyond 
tariff-cutting, instead focusing on restricting the use of explicitly “national” rules 
on investment, and intellectual property protection.58 In addition, there has been 
a significant expansion in bilateral investment treaties, where countries concede 
national sovereignty in order to encourage inbound FDI.59 The combination of 
deep RTA provisions and investment treaties suggests that many countries want 
to place disciplines on economic activities that were never included in the terms 
																																								 																				
52 See Baldwin, supra note 51, at 106 (noting how the increased membership of developing 
countries to the WTO led to a shift in power resulting in more difficult trade negotiations 
and increased participation in defensive coalitions by developing countries).  
53 See id. at 108 (discussing the difficulties in reach a consensus on multilateral trade 
agreements after developing countries dropped tariffs to increase offshore industrialization). 
54 See id. at 98–101 (providing an analysis of lowering effective tariff rates among low-income 
and high-income countries, including within the United States, throughout the lifespan of the 
GATT). 
55 See id. at 106–111 (summarizing the internal and external forces impeding the formation 
of multilateral trade agreements). 
56 Id. at 106. See also Gordon H. Hanson, The Rise of Middle Kingdoms: Emerging 
Economies in Global Trade, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 42 (2012) (discussing shifts in 
international trade from dominant trade flows between high-income countries to an increased 
share in trade involving developing countries). 
57 See Baldwin, supra note 49, at 107 (noting how the rise in regionalism and difficulty in neg-
otiating WTO trade agreements complicated attempts at reaching multilateral trade agreements). 
58 See id. at 107 (stating that these “deep” RTAs “went beyond tariff-cutting and included 
legally binding assurances aimed at making signatories more business-friendly to trade and 
investment flows from other signatories”).  
59 Id. at 107–8. 
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of reference of the WTO.60 Fourth, despite the lack of any substantive progress 
in the Doha Round, the rise of offshoring has resulted in unilateral cutting of 
tariffs by developing countries seeking to become part of international 
production networks, and as a consequence, developed countries are now less 
interested in multilateral trade talks.61 
 
C.  Deep vs. Shallow Integration 
	
There is an important qualitative difference between the “shallow” 
integration of the GATT/WTO, characterized by tariff-cutting, and the “deep” 
integration typically found in RTAs. The GATT/WTO was designed to prevent 
countries from using tariffs to improve their own terms-of-trade at the expense 
of their trade partners.62 If a country is “large,” it can use import tariffs  to lower 
the world price of its imports relative to the world price of its exports, and 
extract surplus from its trade partners. The GATT/WTO contains provisions 
that curb member states’ appetites for tariffs beyond what is politically optimal 
by promoting reciprocal exchange of market access granted in a non-
discriminatory way to all other GATT/WTO members.63  
Mutual exchange of market access was the appropriate focus of trade 
negotiations in the “made-there-sold-here” economy.64 More recently, tech-
nological advances have allowed firms to “offshore” production processes that 
used to be contained within a single, domestic firm.65 In 2015, intra-firm trade 
accounted for about one third of global exports,66 and a little less than half of 
all U.S. trade is intra-firm, or between a parent company and its affiliates 
																																								 																				
60 See id. at 108 (noting that these agreements did not directly compete with the WTO, but 
provided evidence that participating nations sought agreements that “went far beyond the 
‘shallow’ disciplines included in WTO talks”). 
61 See id. at 108 (discussing how developing countries opted to reduce tariffs to increase 
industrialization by joining international production networks, which reduced incentives to 
engage in multilateral talks). 
62 Kyle Bagwell et al., Is the WTO Passé?, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 11–25, 1126–27 (2016) (discussing 
how the GATT “facilitated gradual, multilateral trade liberalization and allowed countries to sus-
tain an extensive period of low most-favored-nation tariffs” with binding, reciprocal agreements). 
63 See id. at 1154–61 (analyzing GATT/WTO negotiations and their rules and provisions, which 
reflect a “norm of reciprocity” and incorporate a nondiscrimination principle embodied in the 
most-favored-nation rules). 
64 See Baldwin, supra note 51, at 96 (“[T]he rules and procedures of the WTO were designed 
for a global economy in which made-here-sold-there goods moved across national borders.”). 
65 See Pol Antràs & Elhanan Helpman, Global Sourcing, 112, J. POL. ECON., 552, 553–55 
(2004) (discussing integrated and disintegrated firms in light of specialization and foreign 
outsourcing trends). 
66 Lakatos & Ohnsorge, supra note 38, at 1.  
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [Nov. 2018 
	
	
50 
abroad.67 International commerce is increasingly characterized by flows of 
investment and know-how from developed to developing countries in 
exchange for low-cost intermediate goods.68 However, a firm’s ability to 
offshore production depends on the quality of governance in those foreign 
countries.69 Multinational companies (MNCs) and their affiliates are interested 
in harmonizing economic policy across countries and ensuring that their 
interests will be protected abroad.70 This has increased the “demand” for deep 
integration among firms in both the developed and developing world.71 
The GATT and its successor the WTO was and is not an appropriate 
mechanism for “deep integration” that goes beyond the reduction of tariffs. The 
GATT/WTO has been concerned primarily with reducing barriers to the trade in 
goods. The most commonly used trade barrier is tariffs; thus, the focus of the 
GATT/WTO throughout most of its existence has been tariff reductions with 
great success; today’s tariff rates are very low by comparison to historical rates 
from the early twentieth century.72 Other barriers pertaining to goods covered by 
																																								 																				
67 See id. at 6–7 (noting from 2002 to 2014 the United States’s share of intra-firm exports in total 
U.S. exports was about 30% and the share of intra-firm exports in total U.S. imports was 50%). 
68 See Jonathan Haskel et al., Globalization and U.S. Wages: Modifying Classic Theory to 
Explain Recent Facts, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 121 (2012) (describing a surge in international 
trade with the U.S. increasingly importing intermediates and final products from low- and 
middle-income countries); see also Marcel P. Timmer et al., Slicing Up Global Value Chains, 
28 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 100, 116 (2014) (concluding that global fragmentation of production 
has rapidly increased resulting in “mature economies relocat[ing] their unskilled-labor-
intensive production activities to lower-wage countries, while keeping strategic and high-
value-added functions concentrated at home”). 
69 See Alberto Osnago et al., Deep Trade Agreements and Vertical FDI: The Devil Is in the 
Details 3–4 (World Bank Grp., Working Paper No. 7464, 2015) (elucidating how 
“contractual frictions are pervasive in international transactions because of differences in 
legal systems, poor institutional quality in certain countries involved in one end of the 
transaction and limited enforcement ability”). 
70 Soo Yeon Kim, Deep Integration and Regional Trade Agreements, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 360–61 (Lisa L. Martin ed., 
2015), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199981755.001.0001/ox 
fordhb-9780199981755-e-25 (stating that “trade and production costs generated by 
incompatibilities in trade-related domestic regulations across countries now figure more 
prominently in the strategies of multinational firms” and such firms “are the key promoters of 
making national regulatory systems compatible, as this helps to reduce the cost of doing business 
abroad and generally improves the operation of the international supply chain”). 
71 See Baldwin, supra note 51, at 111 (discussing how the rise in offshoring has led to more deep 
regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties where the WTO was unable to address 
issues affecting international production networks). 
72 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 200 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW] (noting that WTO member countries have agreed to bind 99 
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the GATT/WTO are quotas, i.e., numerical restrictions imposed on imports,73 
anti-dumping duties imposed on imports sold at below cost or predatory prices 
to gain a foothold on the internal market,74 and subsidies, which are government-
provided funds that reduce the cost of production of an exporter, and which gives 
exporters a competitive advantage.75 All of these barriers are directly related to 
the trade in goods and are subject to discipline under the GATT/WTO and its 
related agreements. The concerns of MNCs about governance and economic 
policy, including issues relating to environmental regulation and labor and 
working conditions, are beyond the scope of the GATT and other WTO 
agreements. To achieve deep integration on these matters of economic policy, 
countries had to negotiate agreements containing these provisions outside of the 
WTO in the form of RTAs or bilateral trade agreements.76 
																																								 																				
percent of tariffs for developed countries, 73 percent for developing countries, and 98 percent 
for economies in transition, which differs significantly from historical rates). 
73 Id. at 265. 
74 See id. at 469 (discussing how “the exporter may use its artificially low-priced exports to drive 
domestic competitors in the export market out of business, or to discourage the development of a 
domestic competitor in the export market[, and] [o]nce this occurs, the exporter can raise its prices 
or lower the quality of its products[,]” thereby causing harm to the import market’s consumers).  
75 See id. at 518 (defining “subsidy” and explaining that export subsidies may result in 
exporters engaging in predatory pricing through artificially depressed prices). 
76 The compatibility of free trade areas and the GATT/WTO needs some explanation. Under 
GATT Article III, the Most Favored Nation (MFN) Principle, all WTO members have an 
obligation to extend any trade benefits given to one WTO member to all other members. See 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
(requiring all signatories to reciprocate internal taxation and regulation exemptions and apply 
such trade provisions similarly among all signatories). Under MFN, free trade areas would be 
impossible because members of the free trade area would have to extend zero tariffs to all other 
WTO members, which would completely undermine the purpose of having a free trade area, i.e. 
to provide zero tariffs only to members of the free trade area. GATT Article XXIV creates an 
exception to the MFN Principle for free trade areas. Id. at art. XXIV (providing exceptions for 
“customs unions” between member countries). GATT Article XXIV explicitly recognizes free 
trade areas as consistent with the GATT/WTO so long as they do not reduce trade between 
members of the free trade area with non-members below levels that would have existed in the 
absence of the free trade area. Id. In other words, free trade areas are permitted so long as they do 
not result in trade diversion from non-members of the free trade area. Members of free trade areas 
are required to first obtain authorization from the GATT/WTO before setting up a free trade area. 
Id. As a practical matter, countries have first established free trade areas and then seek approval. 
Of course, a rejection of a free trade area by the GATT/WTO would require the undoing of an 
existing free trade area created after many years of negotiations with sunk political costs. For this 
reason, no free trade area has even been challenged or found invalid due to trade diversion effects. 
For a further discussion of how preferential trade areas in goods, services, and intellectual 
property are compatible with MFN, see CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 
supra note 72, 161–62 (providing a general overview of the GATT exceptions to MFN 
obligations and explaining the special exceptions for preferential trade areas). 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [Nov. 2018 
	
	
52 
One early example of deep integration was the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), negotiated by the United Sates, Canada, and 
Mexico. NAFTA lowered tariffs, but it is important to note that all the signatories 
to NAFTA were also signatories to the GATT77. Although bound tariff rates were 
fairly high for Mexico under GATT, the United States and Canada were members 
of the Quad, and had already cut tariffs significantly. Perhaps more important 
were the behind-the-border changes; NAFTA required reforms to domestic laws 
governing market access, competition policy, state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
and regulation of monopolies.78 NAFTA also greatly strengthened protections for 
intellectual property and foreign investment.79 These reforms required under 
NAFTA would not have been possible under the WTO. 
NAFTA illustrates some important features of modern RTAs. First, 
although RTAs frequently include tariff reductions, their effects on tariffs 
globally has been modest. Despite the recent explosion of RTAs, 84% of global 
merchandise trade (excluding intra-EU trade) still takes place at GATT/WTO-
negotiated tariff rates.80 Second, RTAs tend to cover a wide range of issues. The 
literature distinguishes between “WTO-plus” provisions, which simply extend 
commitments already covered under the WTO, and “WTO-extra” provisions, 
which deal with issues not covered by WTO agreements.81 RTAs can have 
dozens of “WTO-extra” provisions.82 An exhaustive list is beyond the scope of 
this article, but they typically include provisions governing competition policy, 
foreign investment, intellectual property issues beyond those covered in the 
WTO, and labor and environmental standards.83 As the prevalence of offshoring 
grows, harmonizing domestic policy will only become more important. 
																																								 																				
77 See The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 1994, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm [https://perma.cc/DMF6-2M8K] (last visited Nov. 11, 
2018) (providing the GATT was signed by Canada in 1948 and Mexico in 1986). 
78 See North American Free Trade Agreement, arts. 1501, 1502, Sept. 6, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605. 
79 See generally Kent S. Foster & Dean C. Alexander, Opportunities for Mexico, Canada 
and the United States: A Summary of Intellectual Property Rights Under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 67, 71 (1994) (noting that 
NAFTA will protect IP via enforcement procedures, dispute settlement and the reduction of 
compulsory licenses, and will protect investment from discriminatory treatment). 
80 Bagwell et al., supra note 62, at 1137. 
81 See e.g., Henrik Horn et al., Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential 
Trade Agreements, 33 WORLD ECONOMY 1565, 1567 (2010) (explaining the difference 
between WTO-plus and WTO-extra provisions). 
82 See Henrik Horn et al., Beyond the WTO?  An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agree-
ments, 33 WORLD ECON., 1565, 1568 (2010) (analyzing trade agreements involving the European 
Community or the U.S. and noting that both sets of agreements contain WTO-plus and WTO-extra 
terms, but European Community agreements use four times more WTO-extra provisions). 
83 See, e.g., id., at 1571-2 (2010) (listing examples of WTO-extra provisions). 
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D.  Deep Integration and TPP 
 
TPP committed signatories to eliminate many tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade with other members.84 This included a commitment to eliminate 
tariffs on manufactured goods and greatly reduce protection for agricultural 
goods.85 Tariff cuts would have been phased in at different rates for different 
products, but 95% of tariff lines would eventually have been cut to zero,86 
resulting in free trade for the vast majority of goods. These proposed tariff cuts 
were part of the “WTO-extra” commitments included in TPP – meaning they 
extended commitments already made under the GATT/WTO. In other words, 
these tariff cuts resulting in free trade would be available for the members of 
TPP trading within the RTA but would not be available for non-members when 
they trade with members of TPP. Members of TPP would be entitled to treatment 
more favorable than that available to non-TPP members under an exception to 
the Most Favored Nation (MFN) Principle of the WTO.87 While the tariff cuts 
appear to offer significant increases in market access, many of the signatories to 
TPP have existing RTAs with each other. The net effect on actual applied tariffs 
would have been moderate.88 The projected economic benefits of TPP were 
more the result of the “deep integration” provisions contained in the agreement. 
Besides cutting tariffs, the agreement also strengthened WTO disciplines 
around Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Measures dealing with food safety,89 
government procurement,90 as well as customs and trade facilitation.91 It also 
added new protections for intellectual property, beyond what was negotiated in 
the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
																																								 																				
84 See FERGUSSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 15 (“TPP would eventually eliminate all 
industrial goods tariffs and most agriculture tariffs and quotas.”). 
85 See id. at 4.  
86 See id. at 15, 18 (noting how the commitments phase in over time so that “[e]ventually 
95% or more tariff lines in each country would be duty-free”). 
87 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 161–62 
(discussing the use of customs unions and free trade areas as exceptions to the MFN principle). 
88 Chad P. Bown, Mega-Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO, 8 GLOBAL 
POL’Y 107, 108 (2017). 
89 TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 7. SPS measures are governed by the WTO Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which is concerned with food safety. See 
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 493, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (laying out obligations 
of signatories to take steps “necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health”). 
90 See TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 15. 
91 Id. at ch. 5. 
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agreement.92 This included additional protections for patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, and trade secrets93. Importantly, TPP required strong domestic 
enforcement of intellectual property (IP) protections, including criminal 
penalties for offenders, again beyond what is required under TRIPS.94 Similarly, 
TPP strengthened protections for international trade in services beyond the 
WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).95 TPP also prohibited 
members from imposing any quantitative restrictions on international trade in 
services or requiring foreign-service providers to establish a local affiliate.96  
TPP also included a chapter on investment that went well beyond those 
commitments contained within the WTO Trade Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) agreement.97 This chapter enshrines many of the provisions contained 
in the model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) used by the State Depart-
ment as a template for all future U.S. BITs.98 Especially important were guar-
antees for the free transfer of funds across borders (subject to some non-
discriminatory safeguard measures) and prohibitions on so called “performance 
requirements” such as technology transfers.99 Investors would also have had the 
right to seek binding international arbitration against host governments that 
violate TPP’s investment provisions.100 
TPP’s other “WTO-extra” provisions covered a range of issues outside 
the scope of current GATT/WTO agreements, although some already exist in 
other RTAs. For example, TPP introduced new rules focused on e-commerce 
and telecommunications.101 TPP prohibited members from blocking or imposing 
																																								 																				
92 See FERGUSSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 8.  
93 See id. at 10 
94 See Kimberly Weatherall, Intellectual Property in the TPP: Not ‘The New TRIPS’, 
Melbourne J. Int’l L. 1, 8 (2017) (“[TPP] requires IP protection that significantly exceeds 
the standards established in TRIPS: copyright and patent rights must last longer; patents (and 
trade marks) must cover a broader range of subject matters; additional tools of enforcement 
must be provided, including very broad criminalization.”). 
95 For example, while GATS includes legal service under its ambit, they are not as detailed as the 
TPP’s or as effective in allowing for transnational legal practice. Compare General Agreement 
on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final 
_e.htm, with TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 10, Annex 10-A. 
96 TPP, supra note 1, at art. 10.5, 10.6. 
97 See FERGUSSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 56 (reviewing TPP provisions on invest-
ments that went “significantly beyond WTO agreements”). 
98 See id. (noting that the TPP mostly incorporates the 2012 Model BIT’s core investor 
protections and exceptions, as well as some provisions that went “somewhat beyond” the 
model BIT). 
99 See id. at 54, 57 (pointing to standard protections in the TPP that comport or exceed BIT). 
100 See id. at 54. 
101 Id. at 35, 66. 
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duties on the transmission of data, or requiring firms from TPP member states to 
build local data centers or transfer source code.102 TPP members were also 
required to ensure that firms have access to domestic telecommunications 
infrastructure “on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions,” and 
any licensing processes are transparent and non-discriminatory.103 
 
E.  “WTO-Extra” Provisions Directed at China 
	
The United States included, starting in 2008, several key provisions in 
TPP that were general in application but specifically directed at China. In a 2016 
article, “The TPP Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade,” 
President Obama stated: 
 
[The TPP] would give us a leg up on our economic competitors, 
including . . . China. Of course, China’s greatest economic opportunities 
also lie in its own neighborhood, which is why China is not wasting any 
time. As we speak, China is negotiating a trade deal that would carve up 
some of the fastest growing markets in the world at our expense, putting 
American jobs, businesses and goods at risk. . . . America should write 
the rules. America should call the shots. Other countries should play by 
the rules that America and our partners set, and not the other way around. 
. . . The United States, not . . . China, should write them.104 
 
Obama’s statement also reflects the U.S. strategic interest in having TPP 
establish the rules for trade in the Asia region before China could do so through 
a rival agreement. As we shall see in the discussion below, the U.S. and China 
have starkly contrasting views on standards of international business and trade.  
 
1. Environmental Obligations 
 
The WTO agreements are largely silent on environmental obligations.105 
TPP sets forth “WTO-extra” enviromental obligations in Article 20 as follows: 
																																								 																				
102 TPP, supra note 1, at arts. 14.3, 14.13. 
103 TPP, supra note 1, at arts. 13.4, 13.22. 
104 Barack Obama, President Obama: The TPP Would Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on 
Global Trade, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/pres 
ident-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/68 
0540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html?utm_term=.518fb2cfe6d9 [https://perma.cc/ 
YW32-TQUT]. 
105 The issue of environmental obligations has a long and tortuous history in the WTO. After 
several decades of indecision, it was finally established that environmental protection 
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1. The Parties recognize that the emissions of certain substances 
can significantly deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer 
in a manner that is likely to result in adverse effects on human 
health and the enviroment. Accordingly, each Party shall take 
measure to control the production and consumption of, and trade 
in, such substances.106 
 
This provision was aimed squarely at China, the world’s largest 
producer of pollutants that damage the earth’s ozone layer.107 Although China 
already produces more carbon from fossil fuels than the U.S. and EU 
combined, China is continuing to increase its use of “dirty fuels” such as coal-
fired power plants that damage the earth’s atmosphere.108 While “dirty fuels” 
are environmentally harmful, they are much cheaper than environmentally 
sustainable alternatives such as gas, solar and wind power commonly used  
in the United States.109 The crux of the U.S. concern about China’s use of 
“dirty fuels” was that it was not only harming the environment but was also 
giving China a competitive advantage in the form of lower manufacturing 
																																								 																				
concerns could be asserted through GATT Article XX, the general exceptions clause, as a 
limit on the trade in goods. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra 
note 72, at 321–23, 334–37 (giving an overview of the previous WTO rejections of efforts 
to adopt strict trade standards based on environmental protection objectives, but explaining 
that subsequent WTO decisions have interpreted the general exceptions clause as authorizing 
more flexibility in targeting environmental harms through trade agreements). As the basis of 
an exception under Article XX, environmental protection concerns have only a narrow 
application within the GATT/WTO. Unlike the TPP, no provision in any of the WTO 
agreements creates affirmative environmental obligations. Id. at 321–23 (citation omitted) 
(detailing how prior GATT panel decisions concluded that “unilateral measures to force 
other countries to change conservation policies cannot satisfy the ‘primarily aimed at’ 
standard” under the general exceptions clause). 
106 TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.5. 
107 See Chow, Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 27, at 394 (“China poses the world's 
single greatest threat to the destruction of the ozone layer, and the key objective of TPP 
Article 20.5 is the protection of the ozone layer.”). 
108 See Keith Bradsher & Lisa Friedman, China’s Emissions: More Than U.S. Plus Europe, 
and Still Rising, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/business/ 
china-davos-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/3W4P-TNYQ] (stating that China’s 
increase in electricity use last year was met by burning more coal).  
109 But see Dominic Dudley, Renewable Energy Will Be Consistently Cheaper Than Fossil 
Fuels By 2020, Report Claims, FORBES, Jan. 13, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
dominicdudley/2018/01/13/renewable-energy-cost-effective-fossil-fuels-
2020/#21d068014ff2  [https://perma.cc/X8SZ-5799] (“[A]ll renewable energy technologies 
should be competitive on price with fossil fuels by 2020.”). 
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costs.110 TPP Article 20.5 would provide the legal basis for the United States 
to require China to use alternative fuels and erode China’s cost advantages.  
 
2. Workers’ Rights 
 
As in the case of environmental obligations, the WTO is silent on 
issues of labor and workers’ rights. By contrast, TPP Article 19.3(1) provides: 
 
Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and 
regulations, and practices thereunder, the following rights as 
stated in the ILO [International Labor Organization] Declaration:  
 
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the    
      right to collective bargaining;  
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;  
(c) the effective abolition of child labour and . . . a prohibition on  
  eethe worst forms of child labour; and  
(d) the climination of discrimination in respect of employment  
      and occupation.111 
 
China is often criticized by the United States for subjecting workers to 
dangerous and unsanitary working conditions, long hours, and permitting what is 
tantamount to slave and forced labor.112 Apart from humanitarian concerns, the 
United States is concerned that China’s disregard of workers’ rights creates low 
labor costs that are a signficant competitive advantage over the United States. For 
example, the average cost of manufacturing labor in China is $2.62 per hour while 
																																								 																				
110 Id.  
111 TPP, supra note 1, at art. 19.3(1). 
112 See, e.g., Alwyn Scott, Foxconn Says Investigating Labor Conditions at China Factory Used 
For Amazon, REUTERS (June 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-china-
labor/foxconn-says-investigating-labor-conditions-at-china-factory-used-for-amazon-idUSKB 
N1J610V [https://perma.cc/A8F4-XK35] (reporting that companies such as Amazon were 
investigated by Chinese watchdog groups and cited with “excessive hours, low wages, 
inadequate training and an overreliance on ‘dispatch’ or temporary workers in violation of 
Chinese law”). See also Jane Perlez, U.S. Report Harshly Criticizes China for Deterioration 
of Human Rights; Russia Also Faulted, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), https://www.ny 
times.com/2000/02/26/world/us-report-harshly-criticizes-china-for-detoriation-human-rights-
russia-also.html [https://perma.cc/UJJ8-RETG] (recounting the U.S. State Department’s 
2000 annual report on human rights, in which China was greeted with “tough language” 
regarding their “widespread and well-documented human rights abuses in violation of 
internationally accepted norms”).  
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the average cost in the United States is $35.53 per hour.113 TPP was designed to 
address these concerns. The ILO standards referenced in Article 19.3 are 
unenforceable outside of TPP as the ILO is a toothless organization without any 
enforcement powers.114 By incorporating the standards of the ILO, TPP has 
created labor standards enforceable under its dispute settlement mechanism.  
In addition, TPP Article 19.5(1) states: “No Party shall fail to 
effectively enforce its labour laws through a sustained or recurring course of 
action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or investment between the 
Parties after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”115 Like many 
countries, China has extensive labor laws on the books but does not actively 
or regularly enforce these laws due to systemic problems such as official 
corruption or indifference.116  
																																								 																				
113 Internationally comparable data on workplace compensation is hard to find for China. For 
the hourly manufacturing wage for the United States in 2011, see BUREAU LABOR 
STATISTICS, USDL-12-2460, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HOURLY COMPENSATION 
COSTS IN MANUFACTURING, 2011 (2012), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ichcc.toc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L8BX-AC82] (stating that the U.S. manufacturing hourly compensation 
costs in 2011 was $35.53). For manufacturing hourly wages in China in 2011, see 
Manufacturing Hourly Compensation Costs in China and India, CONFERENCE BOARD 
(2018), https://www.conference-board.org/ilcprogram/index.cfm?id=38270 [https://perma. 
cc/G2W5-GR9Y]  (reporting that China’s hourly wage in 2011 was $2.62). However, China 
has generally been experiencing increases in hourly wages. In 2016, Chinese manufacturing 
labor hit $3.60. ‘Made in China’ Isn’t So Cheap Anymore, and That Could Spell Headache 
for Beijing, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2017, 12:37 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/chinese-
wages-rise-made-in-china-isnt-so-cheap-anymore.html [https://perma.cc/R5W7-U42L]. This 
force of rising labor costs could cause factories to flee for other countries and/or invest in 
capital equipment. See Pan Kwak Yuk, Want Cheap Labour? Head to Mexico, not China, 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/bddc8121-a7a0-3788-a74c-cd2b49 
cd3230 (reporting that Mexico, with lower hourly wages that China, might be used as an 
alternative source for cheap labor). 
114 See Anthony Freeman, ILO Labor Standards and U.S. Compliance, 3 PERSP. WORK 28, 
29 (1999) (discussing how the ILO is a voluntary organization which that has no enforcement 
powers other than “condemnatory language”). See also Neil Gough, The Workers Who 
Regret Trump’s Scrapping of a Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.ny 
times.com/2017/03/01/business/trump-tpp-trade-vietnam-labor-environment.html [https://per 
ma.cc/E44K-G3YJ] (discussing how agreements like the TPP give teeth to labor 
protections).  
115 TPP, supra note 1, at Art. 19.5(1).  
116 See Kinglun Ngok, The Changes of Chinese Labor Policy and Labor Legislation in the 
Context of Market Transition, 73 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 45, 55 (2008) 
(pointing to weak local government oversight of factories and lack of strong enforcement 
laws for violations of labor contracts as reasons for why the Chinese labor contract system 
functions poorly). See also China’s Labour Law Is No Use to Those Who Need it Most, 
ECONOMIST (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.economist.com/china/2017/08/17/chinas-labour-
law-is-no-use-to-those-who-need-it-most [https://perma.cc/MWB5-8RXQ] (arguing that 
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Due to these systemic weaknesses, any attempt to use China’s legal 
system to enforce labor laws will be difficult, if not futile. Under TPP, 
China’s enforcement of its own labor laws becomes a TPP obligation and 
enforceable through the TPP dispute settlement system. These two provisions 
(along with others) are designed to raise the level of protections for workers 
in China and level the playing field by raising labor cost, a key input in 
manufacturing. From the perspective of the United States, raising labor cost 
is important because this measure erodes one of China’s major advantages in 
international trade. 
 
3. State-Owned Enterprises 
 
One of the most contentious issues between the U.S. and China concerns 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).117 The U.S. believes that the Chinese 
government engages in unfair trade and business practices by providing various 
forms of financial and regulatory assistance to its SOEs at the expense of 
multinational companies.118 An SOE is a business entity that is an administrative 
unit of the State and is owned by the State as opposed to any private person or 
group of persons.119  
																																								 																				
recent labor laws have not protected the Chinese workforce); Geoffrey Crothall, Opinion, 
Refusing to Honor Labor Rights Backfires on China, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2016), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/opinion/refusing-to-honor-labor-rights-backfires-on-china.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z2XY-XLTD] (discussing how China’s lack of labor law enforcement has 
led to large-scale unrest among workers). 
117 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO 
COMPLIANCE 75–78 (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%20 
2017%20WTO%20Report.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ON CHINA] (discussing the importance of state-controlled entities in China and 
the United States’s unsuccessful attempts at accessing information on these entities by 
enforcing WTO notification requirements); Zhenhua Lu, US Urged to Block China’s State 
Companies from Buying High Security Risk American Assets, S. CHINA MORNING POST 
(Nov. 16, 2017, 8:28 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120 
122/us-urged-block-chinas-state-companies-buying-high [https://perma.cc/2AGH-M48A] (rep-
orting that the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended “that 
Congress consider updating legislation pertaining to national security reviews of foreign 
investment to address ‘current and evolving security risks’” stemming from SOEs in China).  
118 See Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises at the Expense 
of Multinational Companies in China and Other Countries, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L. 455, 455–56 
(2016) (stating that China “uses a set of policies that seem designed to promote its own state-
owned enterprises . . . at the expense of foreign multinational companies . . . doing business 
in China and in other countries”). 
119 Id. at 466. 
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China views SOEs as “the lifeline of the economy”120 and has 
vowed to incessantly strengthen their vitality.121 China has a web of 
policies seeking to promote SOEs as “national champions”122 capable of 
competing with or surpassing the world’s most powerful multinational 
companies.123 A key point of contention is the United States’ position that 
China systematically provides subsidies or finanical asistance to SOEs in 
the form of direct grants or as well as indirect transfers through 
intermediate entities indirect transfers.124 China’s state provided financial 
and non-financial assistance to SOEs allows them to operate at lower costs, 
allowing them to enjoy a competitive advantage both within China and in 
the international realm.  
TPP Article 17.6 prohibits any “non-commercial assistance,” 
including susidies, to any SOE relating to the production of goods or the 
supply of services.125 Under Article 17.6 “non-commercial assistance” refers 
to assitance that is not available in the marketplace and is provided by a 
government.126 Specifically, assistance to SOEs refers to:  
 
(i) direct transfers of funds or potential direct transfer of funds or 
liabilities, such as:  
      A. grants or debt forgiveness; 
      B. loans, loan gurantees or other types of financing on terms  
           more favourable than those commercially available to that  
           enterprise; or  
																																								 																				
120 See Ian Johnson & Keith Bradsher, On Way Out, China’s Leader Offers Praise for the 
Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/asia/ 
hu-jintao-exiting-communist-leader-cautions-china.html [https://perma.cc/8TCR-Z8HX] (quot-
ing Hu Jintao, former general secretary of the Communist Party in China, from his address 
to the 18th Party Congress before stepping down). 
121 See China State Arms Maker Pledges ‘Mixed Ownership’ Reforms, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 
2017, 6:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-norinco/china-state-arms-maker-
pledges-mixed-ownershipreforms-idUSKBN14P165 [https://perma.cc/CMB9-FZ5S] (dis-
cussing China’s ambitious reform plans to strengthen and make more competitive SOEs). 
122 See KJELD ERIK BRØDSGAARD & KOEN RUTTEN, FROM ACCELERATED ACCUMULATION 
TO SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY IN CHINA 156, 161–62, 164 (2017), https://www. 
jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h2tj.11 (discussing the Chinese government’s strategies and 
reforms to its SOEs to compete with multinational corporations).  
123 See id. at 156, 161–62 (explaining how China’s policies are intended “to strengthen the 
international competitiveness of” its SOEs). 
124 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA, supra note 117, 
at 6–7, 12–13, 75. 
125 TPP, supra note 1, at art. 17.6. 
126 Id. at art. 17.1. 
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       C. equity capital inconsistent with the usual investment    
              practice, including for the provision of risk capital, of  
              private investors; or 
(ii) goods or services other than general infrastructure on terms  
      more favourable than those commerical available to that  
      enterprise . . . .127 
 
The WTO also disciplines the use of subsidies under the GATT and the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Meaures (SCM),128 but the 
WTO deals with subsidies in general while TPP deals specifically with subsidies 
provided to SOEs. TPP’s broad definition of a subsidy is crucial because a 
breach of this obligation allows the United States to impose sanctions in the form 
of countervailing duties, i.e., an additional tariff, to offset the financial effect of 
the subsidy. In other words, TPP would give the United States a stronger legal 
justification for the imposition of countervailing duties on China’s SOEs than 
that currently available under the WTO. The availability of this option under 
TPP would allow the United States to have a stronger case for imposing trade 
sanctions on China to offset the effect of subsidies given to SOEs and erode one 
of China’s major advantages in international trade. 
  
4. Technology Transfer 
 
The Trump Administration has repeatedly voiced vehement objections 
to China’s alleged practices that force U.S. companies to tranfer their 
technology.129 In a Presidential Memorandum issued on March 22, 2018, 
President Trump declared: 
 
China uses foreign ownership restrictions, including joint 
venture requirements, equity limitations, and other investment 
restrictions, to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S. 
companies to Chinese entities.  China also uses administrative 
																																								 																				
127 Id. at Art. 17.1. 
128 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter SCM]. 
129 See Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 
301 Investigation of China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology 
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,099, 13,099–100 (Mar. 22, 
2018) (listing grievances against China for coercive trade practices as support for directing 
the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate issuance of retaliatory tariffs). 
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review and licensing procedures to require or pressure 
technology transfer, which, inter alia, undermines the value of 
U.S. investments and technology and weakens the global 
competitiveness of U.S. firms.130 
 
The concerns expressed by the Trump Administration typically arise 
in the following context. An MNC with its headquarters in the U.S. seeks to 
establish a wholly owned business entity in China in order to manufacture 
products or provide services for the Chinese and international markets. Due 
to China’s legal restrictions on foreign investment, the MNC is not permitted 
to establish a wholly owned business entity in the particular industry, such as 
telecommunications.131 Rather, foreign investment in the industry is 
permitted only in the form of a joint venture, a business entity that is jointly 
owned by the MNC and a Chinese company.  As the WTO does not cover 
investment, except tangentially,132 and the United States and China do not 
have a BIT, China is free to set any restrictions on foreign investment 
consistent with its own internal legal requirements. China is free to require 
that the MNC partner with a local Chinese enterprise, such as an SOE. If the 
MNC decides to go ahead with the joint venture, it will be required to obtain 
various regulatory approvals by Chinese authorities. When the MNC applies 
for approval, Chinese authorities require or pressure the MNC at the approval 
stage or later in an administrative review or licensing stage to transfer 
technology to the joint venture.133 The reasoning by the Chinese authorities 
																																								 																				
130 Id. at 13,099. 
131 China classifies proposals for joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned entities into four 
categories depending on the industry: encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited under 
the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalog first promulgated in 1997 and updated 
versions in 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2017. NAT. DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N & MINISTRY OF 
COMMERCE OF CHINA, CATALOGUE OF INDUSTRIES FOR GUIDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(REVISION 2017), INVEST IN CHINA (July 28, 2017) http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121 
_39_4851_0_7.html [https://perma.cc/6FKK-5SZ2]. 
132 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 397-99 (3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter 
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS] (explaining how the 
WTO treats foreign direct investment). 
133 This observation is based on the author’s own experience working in China as in-house 
counsel for a multinational company. The author was present at numerous meetings with 
Chinese officials during the approval process for the company’s joint ventures and corporate 
organizations. These officials regularly asked for advanced technology to be transferred to the 
joint venture. The implication was clear that failure to comply with these requests would result 
in an impasse or a long delay in the approval process. The author has had discussions with other 
attorneys in China who indicate that other multinational companies face the similar demands. 
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is that the joint venture cannot be successful unless it has access to the U.S. 
company’s advanced technology in the form of patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, trade secrets, or know-how.134 As the joint venture is a Chinese 
company formed under Chinese law, the transfer of technology by the MNC 
to the joint venture is a form of technology transfer to a Chinese company. 
Moreover, since the Chinese partner is an equity owner of the joint venture, 
the Chinese partner, an SOE in our hypothetical, also becomes an owner of 
the U.S. sourced technology. Although the MNC is not actually being 
“forced” to set up a joint venture in China and submit to this technology 
transfer process, the U.S. company cannot have access to the Chinese market 
unless it agrees to form a joint venture. U.S. companies claim that this choice 
is tantamount to being “forced” to transfer their technology to a Chinese 
company or to the Chinese government.  
United States concerns about China’s technology transfer practices are 
not new to the Trump Administration. Previous United States administrations 
recognized that the WTO’s TRIPS agreement, although a landmark agreement, 
is silent on the type of technology transfer arrangement that is discussed above 
and that is the crux of United States concerns. To close this gap, when the United 
States drafted TPP, the United States inserted Article 9.10(1)(f), which provides: 
 
No Party shall, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other 
disposition of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-
Party in its territory, impose or enforce any requirement, or 
enforce any commitment or undertaking . . . to transfer a 
particular technology, a production process or other proprietary 
knowledge to a person in its territory . . . .135 
 
By going beyond TRIPS, TPP provided the United States with a legal 
basis to challenge China’s scheme to compel U.S. companies to transfer their 
technologies as a condition of being allowed to set up a company in China.  
 
II. EXPECTED ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TPP 
	
While the previous part of this article examined the strategic goals of 
TPP, this part now turns to the expected economic benefits of TPP. A large 
body of academic work supports the view that TPP would create significant 
economic benefits for the United States and its other members. 
																																								 																				
134 See id. 
135 TPP, supra note 1, at Art. 9.10(1)(f). 
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A. Income Gains 
	
Substantial global economic growth was expected from TPP. Under 
TPP, $492 billion would have been added to global GDP by 2030, including 
a $131 billion increase (0.5%) in U.S. GDP and a $125 billion (2.5%) in 
Japanese GDP.136 There would also have been a significant growth impact 
for some of the emerging economies included in TPP.137 For example, 
Vietnam and Malaysia were anticipated to experience 8.1% and 7.6% 
increases respectively in their GDP, amounting to $41 and $52 billion.138 In 
particular, Vietnam, a low labor cost economy, was expected to expand as a 
manufacturing hub in industries such as textiles and apparel.139 These 
expected gains in GDP reflect benefits from both increased trade as well as 
FDI, with a large part of the gains to the United States likely to have come 
from trade in services and FDI in the service sector.140  
 
B. Tariff-Cutting 
 
While there is currently a low trade-weighted141 average tariff rate of 
2.6% applied by TPP members against other TPP members, there is quite a 
bit of variation across TPP members, leaving room for substantial trade 
liberalization.142 Average trade-weighted applied tariffs vary from 0.4% in 
																																								 																				
136 Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 14–15 (citing large projected annual income gains for 
Malaysia and Vietnam). 
137 See id. (listing the projected benefits for countries such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, 
and Peru). 
138 Id. at 14. 
139 C.f. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Rules of Origin in Textiles and Apparel, in 1 ASSESSING THE 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 66, 70, 72–73 (2016), 
https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/assessing-trans-pacific-partnership-volume-1-mar 
ket-access-and-sectoral (discussing how the TPP could benefit the textile and apparel 
industries in Vietnam, and that the size of such benefits depends on whether rules of origin 
are eliminated or if FDI would shift from China to Vietnam). 
140 See Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 15 (concluding that the TPP would result in 
significant increases in exports, and that the U.S. would have been one of the largest recipients 
of inward FDI). 
141 The average of a country’s tariffs weighted by the value of its imports. 
142 Caroline Freund et al., Tariff Liberalization, in Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 
31, 31–33 (2016), https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/assessing-trans-pacific- 
partnership-volume-1-market-access-and-sectoral (noting that the extent of liberalization 
“depends on current applied tariff rates and existing free trade agreements,” and that despite 
relatively low tariffs, potential TPP members had varying tariff rates). 
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Singapore to 6.2% in Vietnam.143 The United States applies an average tariff 
of 1.2% against other TPP members, with its highest applied tariff being 4.4% 
against Vietnam.144 In terms of actual tariff-cutting, almost 75% of all tariffs 
were scheduled to be removed once the TPP was formally in place, and 
eventually , 99% of trade in goods were to be liberalized.145 With respect to 
the timeline and specific products, almost all tariffs, including the 350% tariff 
on U.S. tobacco and tobacco products would have been zeroed out by year 
sixteen of TPP being in force.146 After year sixteen, only U.S. tariffs on 
imports of Japanese automobiles and trucks, at 2.5% and 25% respectively, 
would have remained in place until year 30 of the agreement.147 
 
C. Trade and Investment Effects 
	
Exports among all TPP countries were projected to grow $1,025 
billion by 2030, an increase of 11.5%.148 The lion’s share of export growth 
would have been captured by the United States, Japan, Vietnam and 
Malaysia, their exports increasing by $357 (9%), $276 (23%), $107 (30%) 
and $99 (20%) billion respectively.149 For the United States, export gains 
would have occurred in primary goods (agriculture and mining), advanced 
manufacturing and service sectors, with increased imports in labor-intensive 
sectors such as textiles and apparel.150 At the same time, the potential for 
trade diversion, where trade between TPP members displaces trade with non-
TPP members, while tangible for countries such as China, India, Korea and 
Thailand, would have been small relative to those countries’ GDP.151 
By 2030, inbound FDI would have increased $446 billion (3.5%) 
compared to an increase in outbound FDI of $305 billion (2%).152 The largest 
recipients of inbound FDI were expected to be the United States, Canada, 
Japan, and Malaysia; and the largest sources of outbound FDI were expected 
to be the United States, Japan, and the EU—inbound FDI exceeding out-
bound FDI due to the improved investment environment within TPP.153 
																																								 																				
143 Id. at 33. 
144 Id. at 33. 
145 Id. at 31. 
146 Id. at 35. 
147 Id. 
148 Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 15–16. 
149 Id. at 16. 
150 Id. at 17. 
151 Id. at 15. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 11. 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [Nov. 2018 
	
	
66 
D. Trade Balance and Employment Effects 
	
In evaluating the macroeconomic effects of TPP, it is important to 
recognize that net national savings and overall employment will typically vary 
around normal long-run levels once any short-term adjustments have 
occurred.154 It is well-understood that an RTA does not affect a country’s trade 
balance unless it also affects long-term net national savings.155 This follows from 
an identity stating that the difference between national savings and investment is 
equal to net exports (imports), i.e., if a country is running a current account 
deficit, it has to finance through either selling assets or borrowing from abroad.156 
Likewise, an RTA cannot affect long-term employment in an economy 
due to market and policy adjustments.157 Overall employment in an economy is 
a macroeconomic phenomenon, driven by aggregate demand and supply for 
labor.158 If an economy is at full employment, increased trade imports) will likely 
result in changes in the composition of jobs, not the number of jobs, and the 
central bank will adjust monetary policy accordingly to offset the effects of trade 
on the job market.159 If the economy is operating at less than full employment, 
the central bank will allow trade expansion (contraction) to persist (loosen 
monetary policy).160 Of course, there may be short-run adjustments in the labor 
																																								 																				
154 See Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economics Of Analyzing The TPP, PETERSON 
INST. INT’L ECON. 3–4 (April 12, 2016), https://piie.com/commentary/testimonies/economics-
analyzing-tpp [https://perma.cc/R2QN-D6JA] (noting that the figures for net national savings and 
overall employment will return to normal trend values for long-term macroeconomic analyses). 
155 See id. at 3 (stating that trade agreements like the TPP will not change trade balances over 
time without provisions to change national savings). 
156 See C. Fred Bergsten, Trade Balances and the NAFTA Renegotiation, PETERSON INST. 
INT’L ECON. 2 (June 2017), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb17-23.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/SZ65-RPFH] (“A shortage of savings generates a net capital inflow that finances a 
trade deficit while insufficient investment (or excess savings) requires a net capital outflow 
that is the counterpart of a trade surplus.”). 
157 See id. at 2–3 (discussing how trade imbalances require changes to macroeconomic 
variables, which is why RTAs target microeconomic factors to increase trade levels rather 
than trade balances). 
158 See Theodore H. Moran, Will the TPP Create More Jobs for Americans? Why the Answer 
is “No”!, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON.: TRADE & INV. POL’Y WATCH (July 7, 2015, 9:45 
AM) (alteration in original), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/will-tpp-
create-more-jobs-americans-why-answer-no [https://perma.cc/W82Z-CZTL] (stating that “the 
number of jobs in an economy [is] a macroeconomic phenomen” which is a function of aggregate 
demand for labor against the supply of labor). 
159 See id. (arguing that any change in net exports will result only in a different allocation of 
labor rather than any increase in demand for labor). 
160 See id. (stating that central banks will respond to positive or negative effects of trade 
policy on the labor market with monetary policy). 
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market from an RTA that can represent an important economic burden in specific 
sectors/communities. In the current political climate, trade has been singled out 
as the main culprit for loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs.161 At the same time, 
recent studies indicate that import competition from China over the past decade 
has had a significant effect on the number of manufacturing job losses as well as 
a negative impact on local job markets.162 There is also empirical evidence that 
NAFTA had very strong local labor market effects in the United States, driving 
down wage growth for blue-collar workers in the most affected industries and 
geographic locations.163 It is not surprising therefore that TPP has been attacked 
by politicians from both sides of the aisle as they tap into deep public concern 
about the effects of globalization.164 
However, some scholars expect that the TPP would not have had a 
very large impact on U.S. employment.165 As resources continue to shift from 
basic manufacturing to traded services and advanced manufacturing, TPP 
was likely to favor skilled labor in the United States, given that the service 
sector is skilled-labor intensive and basic manufacturing is capital/low-
skilled labor intensive.166 While returns to all inputs would have increased 
due to productivity gains, wages would have increased by more than returns 
to capital, and wages of skilled workers would have increased more than 
those of unskilled workers.167 
																																								 																				
161 See Donald J. Boudreaux, Trade Is Not a Job Killer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/opinion/trump-tariffs-trade-war.html [https://perma.cc/LKS9-
LSR3] (relating how President Trump has focused on trade-related issues as a primary cause 
of job loss). 
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2000s, 34 U. CHI. J. LAB. ECON. 141, 160–162 (2016) (listing the job loss incurred by 
American industry due to Chinese imports).  See also David H. Autor et al., The China 
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ECON. REV. 2121, 2125 (2013) (showing the negative consequences of low-income-country 
imports causing unemployment and lost wages on local American labor markets). 
163 See Shushanik Hakobyan & John McLaren, Looking for Local Labor Market Effects of 
NAFTA, 98 REV. ECON. & STAT. 728, 729–30 (2016) (noting NAFTA’s negative effects on 
American workers in local labor markets). 
164 See Jason Margolis & Lucy Martirosyan, What is the TPP and Why Are Both Parties So 
Angry About It?, PRI: THE WORLD (July 26, 2016, 4:45 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/ 
2016-07-26/what-tpp-and-why-are-both-parties-so-angry-about-it [https://perma.cc/YWB2-
Y6A8] (noting Democratic Senator Bernie Sanders’ and then-presidential-nominee Donald 
Trump’s opposition to the TPP). 
165 See Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 10–11 (claiming that the TPP shouldn’t have very 
much of an effect on unemployment). 
166 See id. at 19. 
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In terms of employment, it has been estimated that 71,900 jobs per year 
in the United States would have been “shifted” over the period 2018–2028 due 
to TPP, where job shifts account for inter-sectoral changes in jobs, i.e., jobs lost 
in one sector(s) relative to jobs gained in another sector(s).168 If these job shifts 
per year are reduced by 25%, which is the percentage of jobs shifted due to 
voluntary and other separations, 53,700 annual job changes in the United States 
would have been involuntary and attributable to TPP.169 Placing this in 
perspective, fifty-five million jobs are “churned” a year in the United States, with 
the TPP accounting for less than a 0.1% increase in the rate of churn.170 
Nevertheless, while some workers displaced by TPP would have been 
reemployed, others would have found it either harder due to age and location, 
and/or they would have ended up getting jobs paying lower wages.171 As a 
consequence, many economists,172 as well as commentators in the media173 
have suggested that the United States should target strategies to support 
workers who bear the cost of trade liberalization, including upgrading skills 
through vocational training, helping workers find new jobs via job exchanges 
and relocation grants, and developing a system of wage insurance to protect 
workers against income loss.174 In other words, the objective is to get the 
winners from trade to compensate those that lose. A more radical view argues 
that policies relating to global economic integration should be rebalanced in 
																																								 																				
168 Id. at 20 (using U.S. data from 2014). 
169 Id.  
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 See Robert Z. Lawrence & Tyler Moran, Adjustment and Income Distribution Impacts of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership 12–13 (Peterson Inst. Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 16-5, 2016), 
https://piie.com/publications/working-papers/adjustment-and-income-distribution-impacts-trans-
pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/6ZWG-V565] (advocating for public unemployment insur-
ance and public investment in human capital and training); see also Paul Krugman, Trade, Labor, 
and Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/opinion/trade-
labor-and-politics.html [https://perma.cc/E8CD-VS4F] (explaining that some European countries 
do not suffer as much from structural unemployment because of sizeable social safety nets). 
173 See Trade, at What Price?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.economist.com/unit 
ed-states/2016/04/02/trade-at-what-price (advocating for labor assistance programs for job 
losses due to trade policies) [https://perma.cc/4HV5-WFNP]; see also Editorial, Jobs and 
Trade on the Campaign Trail, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
04/03/opinion/sunday/jobs-and-trade-on-the-campaign-trail.html [https://perma.cc/BY66-C 
BBM] (advocating for larger, European-style social safety nets, wage insurance, and subsidies 
for businesses who rehire victims of trade policy). 
174 See Lawrence & Moran, supra note 172, at 2 (arguing for programs to aid victims of trade 
policies, and specifically supporting an enhanced Trade-Adjustment Assistance program 
with wage insurance). 
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three ways: from capital and the business sector to labor and society at large, 
from global to national governance, and to an outcome where the overall 
benefits are larger.175 
 
E. Sectoral Effects 
 
The expected sectoral effects of TPP need to be placed in the overall 
context of the structure of the U.S. economy. As of 2016, the U.S. 
manufacturing sector accounted for 10.2% of employment — down from 
14.3% in 2000 — a decline that has continued irrespective of U.S. trade 
policy, driven by growth in productivity.176 Given that the U.S. economy is 
unambiguously a service-oriented economy, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the expected positive impact of TPP on trade would have been concentrated 
in that sector, along with sectors such as agriculture and advanced 
manufacturing, where the United States has clear comparative advantage.177 
In light of this, it is interesting to examine what the expected benefits of TPP 
were for the U.S. services and agricultural sectors, along with the automobile 
sector, where the United States managed to bargain a degree of continued 
protection for its domestic market against Japanese import competition.178  
 
1. Trade in Services 
 
 Currently, the U.S. tradeable business services sector, which includes 
financial services, R&D, healthcare, and education services, accounts for 
25% of U.S. employment, and the sector enjoyed a trade surplus in cross-
border transactions of $233 billion in 2014.179 The U.S. comparative 
																																								 																				
175 See Dani Rodrik, The Trouble with Globalization, MILKEN INSTIT. REV. (Oct. 20, 2017), http:// 
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(arguing that approaches to economic integration must change if globalization is to be saved). 
176 See Robert Lawrence, Recent US Manufacturing Employment: The Exception that Proves the 
Rule 2, 11, 13 (Peterson Inst. Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 17-12, 2017) https://piie.com/ 
system/files/documents/wp17-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/S686-Z38H] (explaining the tradeoff 
between employment and labor productivity). 
177 See Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 17 (noting that the TPP benefitted sectors in which 
the United States had a comparative advantage, including service industries). 
178 See Sarah Oliver, Auto Sector Liberalization, in 1 Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Market Access and Sectoral Issues 60, 62 (2016), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb 
16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ87-S5SB] (finding that the TPP maintained some protections for the 
U.S. auto industry, and pointing to the continued high tariffs on trucks as an example). 
179 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Liberalization of Services Trade, in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 81–82 (2016), https://piie. 
com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ87-S5SB]. 
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advantage in services is based on three factors: the presence of large efficient 
firms, highly educated personnel, and extensive use of information 
technology.180 At present the sector faces high barriers to cross-border trade 
with other TPP members, with overall ad valorem equivalent tariffs on 
service imports estimated to range from 20% in Singapore to 73% in Mexico, 
the average tariff equivalent in the financial services sector being 55%.181 
There was considerable focus in the TPP negotiations on the services 
sector, the final agreement covering 12 sectors and 168 subsectors. In 
addition, four of the TPP chapters were targeted exclusively at a range of 
issues relating to cross-border trade and investment in services.182 
Essentially, TPP members agreed to “fair and equal” treatment for firms who 
wanted to enter their markets through trade or investment or both, and any 
unilateral liberalization offered by one TPP member would be offered to all 
other TPP members.183 The bottom line: under TPP, member countries 
committed to significantly reducing trade barriers, with U.S. service exports 
expected to increase $149 billion by 2030, which accounts for 67% of overall 
increased TPP trade in services.184 In the case of financial services, it is 
important to note that while TPP committed members to increased market 
access and non-discrimination, it would have essentially preserved national 
sovereignty over this sector.185 Nevertheless, the TPP chapter was significant 
for two reasons: first, post-financial crisis, it would have brought together a 
set of countries with quite different financial sectors; second, commitments 
by TPP members generated a set of standards for regulation of the sector, 
which could then have been applied to countries such as China and Korea if 
they subsequently chose to join TPP. 
The TPP agreement also recognized the importance of proper 
“prudential” financial regulation by members, which refers to rules such as 
minimum capital requirements for banks and appropriate protections for 
investors and depositors.186 Previous trade and investment agreements have 
exempted such regulations from their scope, as long as they are not used to 
undermine members’ commitments to an agreement.187 TPP contained such 
																																								 																				
180 Id. at 84. 
181 See id. at 83. 
182 Id. at 84. 
183 Id. at 85. 
184 See id. at 84. 
185 Anna Gelpern, Financial Services, in 1 ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, 
MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES 91, 91 (2016), https://piie.com/system/files/doc 
uments/piieb16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ87-S5SB]. 
186 Id. at 95. 
187 Id.  
Vol. 4:1]                United States Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
	
	
71 
a prudential “carve-out” which also covers national monetary and credit 
policies, and financial emergency rescue policies such as the U.S. Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) implemented in 2008.188        
2. TPP and Agriculture 
 
 Over the period 2010–12, agricultural imports by TPP members totaled 
$279 billion.189 Fifty-one percent were sourced from other TPP partners, while 
43% of their agricultural exports went to TPP partners.190 Canada and Mexico 
are both highly dependent on other TPP members for agricultural exports and 
imports, mostly due to their trade with the United States.191 For the United States 
over the same period, 42% and 47% of its agricultural exports and imports 
respectively went to or were sourced from other TPP members.192 
Agricultural products traded between TPP members are currently 
subject to higher applied tariffs on average than industrial  products—7.6% vs. 
1.5%—although bilateral protection varies considerably by country.193 For 
example, average applied agricultural tariffs are 3.6% at the U.S. border 
compared to 23% at the Japanese border.194 Agricultural tariffs also vary based 
on whether trading partners are members of an existing RTA, and also by 
product. For example, Mexico’s average applied agricultural tariff against TPP 
members is 15.6%, ranging from 30.7% against Australia to 3.2% and 1% on 
agricultural imports from Canada and the United States, its NAFTA 
partners.195 In the case of specific agricultural products, different TPP members 
currently have high levels of protection for different products. For example, 
Canada protects its markets for dairy products, poultry and eggs, with its 
average applied tariff on U.S. dairy products being 110% even though Canada 
and the United States are both members of NAFTA.196 Japan protects its 
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markets for beef, rice, wheat, barley, sugar, dairy products, and selected fruit 
and vegetables.197 Japan applied import duties on cereals exceeding 200%, 
largely due to the level of protection afforded to its rice sector.198 In the case 
of the United States, sugar, selected dairy products, and tobacco are protected, 
with the applied tariff on tobacco products currently applied at 350%.199 
In order to evaluate what might have been the extent and potential 
impact of agricultural trade liberalization under the TPP agreement, it is 
useful first to report the results of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
(USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS) study that estimated the impact 
of removing all agricultural tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) by 
2025.200Given the ERS study assumed removal of all existing barriers to 
agricultural trade between TPP countries, this can be considered an upper 
bound to what might have been the likely trade effects of TPP on the 
agricultural sector. The USDA/ERS estimates indicate that TPP would result 
in a 6.3% increase in agricultural trade by 2025.201 This increase would 
account for an additional $8.5 billion in the agricultural marketplace.202 TPP 
was also expected to increase U.S. market access to several countries where 
it currently has no RTA, notably Japan, where 50% of U.S. agricultural 
exports would have faced zero tariffs once TPP was implemented.203 In the 
case of other agricultural products, preferential access would have been given 
under new TRQs, where specified levels of imports would be subject to low 
tariffs, including dairy products imported by Canada, and rice, wheat and 
barley imported by Japan.204 With increased market access, USDA/ERS had 
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anticipated that TPP would result in the U.S. accounting for 33% and 10% 
respectively of the overall increase in intra-TPP agricultural exports and 
imports by 2025.205 Overall, the U.S. agricultural sector was expected to be a 
big winner from implementation of TPP, exports to Japan accounting for a 
large share of these trade gains. 
Of course, while TPP was expected to result in considerable 
liberalization of agricultural trade, the nature of the agreement was such that 
there would have been a phase-in period across countries and products.206 
Once the agreement took effect, almost 32% of tariff lines in Japan, 31% in 
Vietnam, 92% in Malaysia, all but one tariff line in Australia, and 99% in 
New Zealand were to be eliminated, with additional liberalization being 
phased in over 15 to 20 years.207 However, significant barriers to market 
access would have remained in some areas, notably the dairy sector, where 
Canada, Japan and the United States backed off dairy sector reform in order 
to maintain domestic support programs.208 
 
3. Trade in Automobiles 
 
 TPP had the potential to more closely integrate the automobile industries 
of the United and Japan, two of the largest in the world, as well as open up market 
access to TPP members such as Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Vietnam. 
Liberalization would have lowered tariffs, reduced non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
such as tax breaks for purchase of domestically-produced automobiles, and 
begun a process of mutual recognition of safety and emissions standards.209 
The United States and Japanese automobile sectors have three key 
trade characteristics: first, Japanese exports exceed those of the United States; 
second, Japanese exports are biased towards the U.S. market while the United 
States has relatively low exports to Japan; and third, mostly as a result of 
integration of the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican automobile sector via 
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NAFTA, the United States exports more than Japan to other TPP members.210 
As a consequence, TPP was expected to expand market access for U.S. 
automobiles to the Japanese and other TPP members’ markets, and at the 
same time increase Japanese exports to Canada and Mexico, while lowering 
its costs of exporting to the United States.211 
In terms of import tariffs, the majority currently fall between 2% and 
10%, the notable outliers being Malaysia, whose rates range between 30% to 
40%, and Vietnam with rates extending up to 70% respectively.212 With the 
exception of U.S. tariffs against Japanese imports of automobiles and trucks, all 
automobile tariffs would have expired within twelve years of TPP being 
implemented.213 However, at the same time as the proposed schedule for tariff-
cutting, the negotiated ROOs would have had a significant impact on trade 
liberalization in the automobile sector: in order to qualify for zero-tariff rates, all 
finished automobiles traded were required to contain 45% TPP-sourced 
content.214 The objective of this ROO was to provide an incentive to U.S. and 
Japanese automobile firms to source parts from countries such as Vietnam, and 
represented a compromise for ROOs applied under NAFTA, and those that 
Japan has previously negotiated in previous trade agree-ments.215 Overall, TPP 
would have liberalized market access to developing country members such as 
Malaysia and Vietnam where demand is growing, but the agreement essentially 
focused on protecting the U.S. and Japanese automobile sectors through trade-
distorting ROOs, and the slow expiration of import tariffs.216  
 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM TPP 
	
A. Abandoning the Strategic Goals of TPP and its Economic Benefits 
 
The withdrawal of the United States from TPP by the Trump Admin-
istration compromises major U.S. interests at least two ways. First, the United 
States stands to lose the economic benefits that would have been created by its 
membership in TPP that will be difficult to replicate. Second, the United States 
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loses the opportunity to lead a deep integration RTA setting standards for Asia 
and containing China in international trade. Although the remaining eleven 
members have signed the CPTPP, the United States was the main architect 
behind TPP and would have been vigilant in policing and enforcing TPP 
standards. Even if China were to join CPTPP, it seems doubtful whether any of 
the remaining members have the economic clout or political will to vigorously 
enforce TPP standards against China and other members. A third disadvantage 
of withdrawing from TPP is that China now has the upper hand in promoting 
RCEP, its own RTA for Asia. 
When the United States drafted TPP, the strategic goal was to box in 
China with the difficult of choice of joining TPP and being subjected to 
“WTO-extra” standards that it had no hand in drafting, or ignoring TPP and 
losing its trade benefits. While it should be clear that ignoring TPP would 
have meant that China would not have enjoyed the benefits of free trade with 
all TPP members, including the United States, it may be less clear that China 
would also have suffered trade losses from non-participation in TPP. Like all 
RTAs, TPP would have been a double edged sword: TPP could have both 
created trade among its members and diverted trade from non-members.217 
Importers in the United States faced with the choice of buying goods from 
China and other TPP members would have had an economic incentive to 
forgo goods from China (subject to WTO tariffs) and purchase the goods 
from other TPP members, such as Vietnam and Japan, which would have 
entered enter the United States tariff-free. In other words, China would have 
felt pressure to join TPP because ignoring it would likely have harmed its 
ability to export to the U.S., its largest and most important market. This was 
the stark choice that TPP was designed to present to China. 
 
B. RCEP 
	
The exclusion of China from the TPP negotiations prompted China to 
formally initiate talks for RCEP, a competing free trade agreement for Asia, in 
2012. Comprised of sixteen nations, including the world’s two most populous 
nations, China and India, RCEP, when completed and in effect, will include 45% 
of the world’s population and 40% of world trade.218 Led by China, RCEP was 
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intended to serve as an economic and strategic counter-weight to TPP. Of the 
sixteen prospective members of RCEP, seven nations are potential members of 
both TPP and RCEP, and ten nations are also members of another RTA, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).219  
Unlike TPP, RCEP contains no substantive obligations on 
environmental protection, workers’ rights, SOEs, and technology transfer. This 
is consistent with all of China’s recent regional trade agreements, which also lack 
any provisions on these subjects.220 Indeed, RCEP seems to further China’s 
interest in promoting the use of fossil fuels such as coal. RCEP contains 
provisions that are intended to promote the use of “dirty fuels” by reducing 90% 
of tariffs on fossil fuels and by allowing its members to challenge 
environmentally friendly regulations by other members as barriers to trade.221 
While China is facing international pressure to reduce the use of “dirty fuels,” 
RCEP is designed to protect China’s ability to do so in the vast Asian market.  
Although RCEP lacks provisions on subjects such as workers’ rights, 
RCEP is likely to contain a provision requiring members to respect the  
right of self-determination in its members. Although the final text of RCEP is 
still being negotiated and only drafts of some chapters have been leaked  
to the public,222 it is possible to draw some lessons from the articles of  
the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) established under the leadership 
of Beijing to serve as a competitor to the U.S.-dominated World Bank in inter-
national lending for infrastructure and economic development projects.223 While 
																																								 																				
regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-issues-and-way-forward/ [https://perma.cc/ 
PUH2-CRHP].  
219 See Yifei Xiao, Competitive Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) vs. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), C. UNDERGRADUATE RES. 
ELECTRONIC J. 1, 5–7 (2015), http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/194 [https://perma.cc/4ZLN-
4MG7] (listing the members of the TPP, APEC and ASEAN agreements). 
220 See Brock Williams, Cong. Research Serv., R45198, Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements: Issues for Congress 51 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45198.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SYA5-RFKK] (detailing China’s regional trade agreements) (giving an 
overview of the enforceable commitments in China’s RTA’s).  
221 See Sam Cossar-Gilbert, 5 Hidden Costs of the RCEP to the People and the Planet, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Oct. 12, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/5-hidden-costs-of-the-rcep-to-
people-and-planet/ [https://perma.cc/4NWV-CMP4] (demonstrating how China’s RCEP 
will erode progress made toward cleaner energy sources). 
222 A website has posted leaked draft chapters of RCEP. See RCEP Leaks, BILATERALS.ORG, 
https://www.bilaterals.org/rcep-leaks (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
223 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255, 1258–59 (2016) [hereinafter Chow, Why China] 
(explaining how China established the AIIB as a competing institution in response to its 
limited involvement in the World Bank and IMF, and that despite the United States’ 
arguments against the AIIB’s creation, many U.S. allies ultimately joined the organization).  
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the World Bank seeks to promote the Washington Consensus, a set of policies 
reflecting the western values of capitalism and free markets of the U.S. and its 
European allies,224 the AIIB reflects the “Beijing Consensus,” a set of policies 
endorsed by China that respects the rights of self-determination and sovereignty 
of each nations to decide controversial issues such as environmental protection 
and human rights free from the interference of other members.225 Article 31(2) 
of its Articles of Agreement state that the AIIB, “its President, officers, and staff 
shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be 
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member concerned. 
Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions.”226 Although 
the final text of RCEP has not been reached and made available to the public, it 
seems highly likely that China, consistent with all of its recent trade agreements, 
will seek to include basic tenets of the Beijing Consensus preserving the rights 
of members to decide issues such as environmental protection and workers’ right 
for themselves. In addition, it also seems likely that China will not include any 
provisions limiting the activities of SOEs or technology transfer practices that 
will harm its own interests. 
With the withdrawal of the United States, China faces a weakened 
CPTPP with greater confidence. RCEP creates economic benefits for China and 
RCEP members, and perhaps more importantly, allows China to write the rules 
of trade for Asia for the twenty first century and to cement its role as the leading 
power in Asia. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The signing of TPP had the potential to have important economic 
effects on its member countries in terms of growth in GDP, trade, and cross-
border investment flows. However, its real significance lay beyond its initial 
impact due to the fact that it has been considered to be pioneering a new type 
of RTA that would have gone beyond shallow integration via tariff-cutting to 
one addressing deep integration in terms of its provisions concerning trade in 
services, FDI, rules on competition and regulatory harmonization. 
																																								 																				
224 See id. at 1277–78 (outlining the policies at the core of the Washington Consensus, which 
include requirements such as market-determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, 
and privatization of SOEs).  
225 See id. at 1280–83 (contrasting the Washington Consensus with “China’s doctrine of non-
interference”).  
226 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INV. BANK 18, https://www.aiib.org/ 
en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_english-
bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).  
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In terms of the mode of trade liberalization, TPP was considered as 
having the potential to deliver additional economic benefits in the long run if 
it provided a means to eventually untangling the Asia-Pacific “noodle bowl” 
of multiple RTAs with their complex ROOs.227 Prior to 2000, many countries 
in “Factory Asia” had unilaterally cut tariffs in order to take advantage of the 
“unbundling” and offshoring of manufacturing processes by Japan.228 With 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, unilateral tariff-cutting in the region 
was replaced by a rapid growth in RTAs, described as a “domino effect.”229 
China itself started the process when it proposed and subsequently signed the 
ASEAN-China agreement,230 with the reaction of countries such as Japan and 
Korea leading to the so-called East Asian “noodle bowl.”231 Importantly, all 
prospective TPP members were part of this growing network of Asia-Pacific 
RTAs.232 For example, the United States already had RTAs with six TPP 
members: Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore; four 
members of TPP were already members of ASEAN: Brunei, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Vietnam; and three members of TPP also had bilateral RTAs 
with ASEAN: Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.233 
These overlapping RTAs forming the “noodle bowl” should also be 
seen in the context of the competing efforts to increase trade liberalization in 
the region, such as the TPP versus RCEP, and the Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) proposed in 2010 by the twenty-one member countries 
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum.234 Importantly, 
there is a view that TPP would have been more ambitious than RCEP in terms 
of the extent of trade liberalization, and that economic benefits would be 
greater from FTAAP being based on TPP as opposed to RCEP.235 Given this 
																																								 																				
227 See Richard E. Baldwin, Multilateralizing Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on 
the Path to Free Trade, 29 WORLD ECON. 1451, 1451 (2006) (positing that mulateralism will be 
necessary to achieve “global duty-free trade” instead of tangled, regional trade agreements).  
228 See id. at 1489 (explaining East Asia’s quick reduction of tariffs in order to accommodate 
the outsourcing of Japanese manufacturing).  
229 See id. at 1491 (discussing the theory that China’s membership into the WTO triggered 
international trade agreements amongst neighboring nations).  
230 Id. 
231 See id. (describing Japan and Korea’s efforts to form new bilateral treaties to shore up 
their defenses against China, in the process creating a tangled “noodle bowl” of agreements).  
232 See FERGUSSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 8 (identifying overlap among prospective 
TPP member countries and those nations affected by the “noodle bowl” of bilateral 
agreements structuring Asia Pacific trade at the time).  
233 See id. (listing trade relationships predating the TPP). 
234 See id. (providing historical context for trade liberalization in the region covered by the TPP). 
235 See Petri & Plummer, supra note 35, at 6, 25 (deeming the TPP a “landmark accord” 
precipitating extensive trade liberalization which would promote integration in the Asia-
Pacific region if used as a blueprint for the FTAAP).  
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background, it is not surprising, therefore, that TPP also had the strategic goal 
of allowing the United States to write the rules of trade for Asia and to contain 
China’s most controversial trade practices. 
Despite the strategic and economic benefits of the TPP, when Donald 
J. Trump was elected to the U.S. Presidency, he decided to withdraw the 
United States from TPP. It is unclear in making this decision whether the 
Trump Administration studied or even considered the possible negative 
consequences of this decision as set forth in this article. Rather than following 
through with the existing strategy of writing the rules for trade in Asia while 
isolating and boxing in China, the United States has chosen to rely instead on 
threats of tariff increases in order to pressure countries into capitulating on 
trade issues. It remains unclear whether a trade policy based on intimidation 
against powerful countries capable of retaliating on equal terms, such as 
China, will be the best long term approach. 
While the U.S. withdrawal from TPP creates serious disadvantages for 
the United States, the decision is reversible and the path to rejoin TPP is both 
open and straightforward at the moment. Nothing prevents a nation that has left 
TPP from rejoining so long as all existing members approve.236 Given the United 
States’s role in spearheading the TPP and its economic clout, the CPTPP 
members might be relieved by the reentry of the United States. Rejoining TPP 
in the near future might allow the United States to regain the lost strategic and 
economic benefits discussed in this article. In fact, the Trump Administration 
considered rejoining TPP in April 2018 but ultimately balked.237  
The United States should be cautioned, however, that a smooth path 
to reentry into TPP may not be available indefinitely. The United States’s 
departure from TPP has created a strategic opening for China. If China takes 
advantage of the U.S. departure by joining TPP before the United States can 
rejoin, China could make U.S. reentry much more difficult as the United 
																																								 																				
236 Kayla Tausche, Can the US Rejoin TPP? Yes — With Permission, CNBC (Jan. 26, 2018, 11:01 
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President Trump’s suggestion that the United States would not join the TPP).  
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States will need the approval of all existing TPP members to rejoin.238 China 
could block or delay the United States from rejoining or seek to exact 
concessions from the United States as the price of readmission. China could 
also attempt to seize a leadership role in TPP in the absence of the United 
States, relegating the United States to a diminished role upon its reentry. Even 
if China decides against joining TPP, a U.S. delay in reasserting its presence 
at the multilateral level in Asia could prove harmful. China will be able to 
continue to strengthen its power in Asia through RCEP, which has purposely 
excluded the United States, and other initiatives, such as “One Belt, One 
Road,”239 an immensely vast and ambitious trade project, while the United 
States remains on the outside. As the case of the AIIB illustrates, China is 
intent on dominating trade in Asia, aggressively defending its interests in 
Asia against U.S. intrusion, and seeking a leadership position in international 
trade.240 At the moment, the U.S. strategy in Asia appears to be limited to one 
of intimidation through threats of tariff increases. Aside from tariff increases, 
the United States appears to be at a standstill or a point of indecision about 
its trade policy in Asia and any next steps in Asia or the rest of the world. The 
U.S. withdrawal from TPP, without further action by the United States such 
as a reversal of the decision, could shift the balance of power over trade and 
economic relations in Asia and then globally to China. 
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